

REFLECTIONS ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON  
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

Francisco R. Sagasti

"The Secretary of Status Quo was the next man to take the stand. 'We are not getting anywhere,' he said, 'and therefore we should call a summit conference without agenda. A summit conference without agenda is destined to get even less than nowhere, but its deliberations will impress those who are impressed by deliberations that get less than nowhere. This has unworked in the past and it will unwork now. If we get less than nowhere fast enough we shall more than hold our own.."<sup>1</sup>

A Look at the Last  
Megaconference of the 70s

The United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTED) was one of the last international "megaconferences" of the 1970s and its relevance and impact have been the subject of controversy. This paper presents an impressionistic and personal review of the Conference and its results, focusing on a few particularly important issues.

After examining the preparatory process for UNCSTED and the lessons that can be derived from it, some conceptual changes introduced at the Conference regarding the role of science and technology in development will

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Francisco R. Sagasti is the Director of GRADE, the Group for Analysis of Development (Apartado 5316, Miraflores, Lima 18, Peru). He was Vice-Chairman of the International Group of Experts on the Financing System created at the Vienna Conference to work out the details of the System.

be examined. The negotiations on the "financing system" agreed upon at Vienna will also be discussed. Then there will be a brief review of the present situation regarding the Vienna Programme of Action and its Operational Plan, the institutional arrangements in the UN, and the Financing System, before outlining some options for the future.

This paper does not provide a detailed analysis of the impact that UNCSTED has had at the national level, nor of the changes in international scientific relations that it may have generated. These two topics figure prominently in the Vienna Programme of Action and its Operational Plan, and are the subject of several reviews at the regional and UN levels that are now under way.<sup>2</sup>

The UNCSTED Process

The UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development was authorised in 1976 by the General Assembly, shortly after its Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions that dealt with the New International Economic Order. At that time, a mild euphoria and sense of good will between developed and developing countries prevailed. However, shortly after those two Special Sessions, the lack of specific proposals and the difficulties encountered in the North-South dialogue created a mood of disillusionment. Toward the end of the decade, the economic upheavals of the major industrial powers, the shift to right-wing governments in several developed countries, and the lack of progress in negotiations in a variety of international fora, led to renewed scepticism regarding the prospects for cooperation



between developed and developing countries.

As a consequence, the August 1979 Conference in Vienna began to appear as another international gathering where general statements about cooperation would be repeated once again, but no concrete action would be taken. As Kissinger once said, the South would be "talked to death by the North."

These difficulties were augmented by the internal squabbles within the UN System during the preparatory process, described by one of the participants as a "bureaucratic nightmare". Furthermore, during most of the preparatory period the Secretariat of the Conference played a passive political and technical role, limiting its activities to the coordination of national and regional initiatives through what was called an "ascending process". This meant that, because of the weaknesses or lack of interest of many institutions in charge of national and regional papers, few substantive ideas were put forward and discussions proceeded in a conceptual vacuum during most of the preparatory process.

Serious negotiations began only a few months before the August 1979 Conference. The developing countries in the Group of 77 adopted their common position on all aspects of the draft Programme of Action; the various groups of developed countries began to react to the Group of 77 proposals; and the Secretariat began to play an active role, coordinating the specialised UN agencies, completing the organisational arrangements, and backing up the negotiations with technical material.

But all the eleventh hour flurry of activity did not change the inertia and the negotiating morass of the preceding two years. This was a clear case of "too little too late." If the negotiations and preparations that took place in the last months before the Conference had started two years earlier, it is likely that -- in spite of the worsening international atmosphere -- a more substantive programme of action would have been agreed upon in Vienna.

The Conference was an organisational mess with more than 4,000 participants from 142 countries and 60 international organisations. A plenary, two committees, several subcommittees, and a large number of working groups met in parallel, while the various regional groups (Asian, African, Latin American, Nordic, Andean Pact, European Economic Community, and so on) also met frequently to assess progress in the negotiations. Some delegates found themselves attending more than 10 meetings daily, without counting informal discussions in corridors and talks with lobbyists from UN agencies and non-governmental organisations. Add to this a large number of social events of all sorts, coordination meetings of national delegations, press conferences, and the need to do individual work on resolutions and alternative texts. A deeply involved delegate would work at many levels and on many fronts simultaneously, trying to make sense out of a complex and chaotic range of events that moved each at its own pace.

Negotiations soon became a battle of words in which articles, conjunctions, prepositions, and one or



another adjective, noun or verb were seen as issues to fight to the end.<sup>3</sup> Even recommendations that applied to developing countries were hotly debated and contested by developed country delegations. The last plenary session was a veritable pandemonium, with compromises hastily worked out in the early hours of the morning, and where strenuous efforts were made to agree on a common programme.

The outcome of UNCSTED, as expressed in the Vienna Programme of Action, can be summarised as follows: a rather subdued set of recommendations for strengthening the endogenous scientific and technological capabilities of developing countries and for restructuring international scientific relations; the outline of an institutional structure to give greater prominence to science and technology for development in the UN System; an agreement to establish a financing system to be designed by an intergovernmental group of experts; and a voluntary Interim Fund of US \$250 million for 1980-1981 to provide resources while the financing system was being designed.

The lessons to be derived from the UNCSTED process are rather obvious. First, there is no substitute for careful preparation over a long period. The three years of the preparatory process -- and the five preparatory committee meetings -- provided many opportunities and ample time to identify issues, search for compromises, obtain agreements, and develop a substantive programme of action. Unfortunately, no advantage was taken of this situation, and everything was left till the last moment. Second, while a participatory process is necessary to obtain national and regional inputs and views,

the Secretariat must exert strong leadership to bring about some coherence out of the various contributions and also to begin substantive negotiations as early as possible. The passive stance adopted by the Secretariat during most of the preparatory period was a handicap for UNCSTED. Third, it is rather doubtful that mega-conferences, at least those organised in the UNCSTED manner at Vienna, are a suitable and efficient mechanism for discussions and negotiations. There is a need for designing and exploring alternative ways of reaching international agreements on complex subjects such as science and technology for development.

#### Some Conceptual Advances at UNCSTED

Those who were involved in the UNCSTED process are probably accustomed to think about science and technology for development in terms of the ideas contained in the Vienna Programme of Action and the background papers for the Conference. However, this may obscure the important conceptual changes introduced during the UNCSTED process. These can be seen more clearly when contrasted with the ideas put forward at the UN Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the benefit of Less Developed Areas, held in Geneva in 1963.

As the final report of the 1963 Geneva Conference revealed, there prevailed at that time a naive belief that science and technology were only a positive force for development; that they could help to "reduce the gap" between rich and poor countries; that they provided "short cuts" to development; and that "developing countries can take advantage of the rate of technological change since the Second World War which has been much



faster than ever in history."<sup>4</sup> A prominent scientist at that Conference used the analogy of a "supermarket" of scientific and technological achievements generated by the industrialised nations, where developing countries could easily find solutions to their problems "off the shelf."

In the years between 1963 and 1979 this optimistic view was strongly questioned. New theories challenged the linear and sequential conception of development associated with the idea of closing the gap between rich and poor countries and emphasised the structural interdependencies between the processes of development and underdevelopment. Science and technology were found to be at the root of an unequal international division of labour between industrialised and developing countries. The accelerated pace of technological change after World War II provided a few industrialised nations with new means for increasing their control over the Third World, making it almost impossible for developing countries to take advantage of the new technological advances.

The Vienna Programme of Action is based on a different conception of the interactions between science, technology and development. This conception emphasises the importance of building endogenous scientific and technological capabilities in the developing countries, of regulating the technology transfer process, of managing the demand for technology, and of taking into account the impact of economic and social policies on the development of scientific and technological capacities. In addition, it stresses that technologies are appropriate only in relation to a given economic, social and

ecological context, and that there is no inherent set of characteristics that would define an "appropriate" technology for all places and at all times. Finally, it also focuses on the selective recovery and upgrading of traditional techniques, which still account for a large share of productive activities in most developing countries.

In view of the difficulties encountered in other aspects of the Vienna Programme of Action, perhaps the most significant achievement of UNCSTED will turn out to be the legitimisation and diffusion of new ways of thinking about the role of science and technology in the process of development.<sup>5</sup>

#### The Financing System for Science and Technology for Development

During the UNCSTED negotiations there was a consensus that additional funds would be required to carry out the Conference recommendations. However, approaches to the problem of resource acquisition differed sharply. Delegations from socialist countries considered that no new mechanism was required, that the existing resources within the UN System should be reallocated, and that contributions "in kind" should be accepted. The Western developed countries stated that resources should be provided on a strictly voluntary basis, using the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as a channel and following the formulation of specific projects. Finally, the Group of 77 stated that new financing arrangements were absolutely necessary.<sup>6</sup>



According to the Group of 77, a separate financing system for science and technology should be created as a separate entity for the specific purpose of building scientific and technological capabilities in developing countries. Its resources should be large enough to have a significant impact and additional to those provided through UNDP and other channels. These resources should comprise assessed contributions, to be paid by all countries according to a predefined scale, as well as voluntary contributions. The amounts contributed should reflect the asymmetries in scientific and technological capabilities between developed and developing countries, they should be predictable and continuous, and they should also be untied. Finally, developing countries should have a major role in the administration of the Financing System.

Targets of US \$2 billion for 1985 and of US \$4 billion for 1990 were proposed by the Group of 77 for the Financing System. These amounts corresponded roughly 1/20 of one per cent of the projected Gross Domestic Product of developed countries, which the UN Advisory Committee on Science and Technology had suggested in the early 1970s as appropriate levels for science and technology aid, and also corresponded to approximately 5 per cent of the projected flows of official development assistance. The proposed method for calculating assessed contributions was based on a percentage of the trade imbalances in technology-intensive goods between developed and developing countries. The general idea was that those countries that had gained significant advantages in international trade because of their higher level of scientific and technological capabilities should contribute more to the Financing system.

The negotiation strategy of the Group of 77 considered a substantive lowering of the targets, a larger role for voluntary contributions, some concessions on organisational aspects, and a gradual build up of resources for the Financing System.

After many rounds of informal discussions during the last three months of the preparatory process, a compromise emerged at the Vienna Conference. Agreement was reached on a voluntary Interim Fund for Science and Technology for Development of US \$250 million for 1980-1981, an institutional structure that involved both the UNDP and the UN Intergovernmental Committee on Science and Technology for Development in running the Financing System, and on the establishment of an Intergovernmental Group of Experts to design the definitive system after a careful examination of the Group of 77 proposals.

The Intergovernmental Group of Experts continued the UNCTED negotiations on financial matters and designed a Financing System that kept some of the features suggested by the Group of 77. However, its proposals excluded assessed contributions and, consequently, could not guarantee the predictability or continuity of funding patterns. A distinction was introduced between "core" resources, which are essentially multilateral and under the direct control of the Financing System, and "non-core" resources, which are supposed to be complementary and may be subject to a certain degree of conditionality. The UNDP was given an operational role, and an Executive Board was created to manage the System, while the Intergovernmental Committee maintained an overall



policy-making role. After protracted negotiations and many delays, the Financing System was finally approved by the General Assembly in 1982, even though the details of the voting procedures in the Executive Committee were still to be defined.

In parallel with the negotiations in the Intergovernmental Group of Experts, representatives from 19 developing countries -- with support from the Secretariat of the Interim Fund -- organised a "goodwill mission" to several oil-rich developing country members of the OPEC and to several western developed country members of the OECD. The idea was to promote an agreement similar to that of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), where these two groups of countries share equally in providing the majority of resources.

However, these fund-raising efforts were unsuccessful and the Interim Fund received only some US \$40 million through 1983, including \$22 million in 1980 and substantially lesser amounts in subsequent years. This contrasts sharply with the goal of US \$250 million for 1980-1981 agreed in Vienna, and with the General Assembly resolution 37/244 which stipulates a target of at least US \$300 million starting in 1983 and no less than US \$600 million for the 1983-1985 period.

Throughout the negotiations during and after the Vienna Conference, the developing countries made a series of concessions on programmatic, institutional, and financial matters, with the expectation that the developed countries would reciprocate by living up to their commitments and contributing significantly to

the Financing System. This has proven to be an ill-founded assumption and requires a substantive revision of the Group of 77 position regarding the UN Financing System for Science and Technology for Development. The present level of contributions constitutes a mockery of the UNCSTED negotiations and the Vienna Programme of Action.

#### The Present Situation and Some Suggestions for the future

Four years after UNCSTED took place, its results do not look very impressive. The Vienna Programme of Action remains a basically sound document, although it requires some adjustments and additions. The Operational Plan agreed by the UN Intergovernmental Committee on Science and Technology for Development to carry out the Programme of Action is rather cumbersome and repetitive; its structure, consisting of eight partially overlapping spheres of action, could certainly be improved. Both the Programme and the Plan are rather general and supposed to apply to all developing countries, regardless of the differences in their levels of scientific and technological capabilities.<sup>7</sup>

The new institutional arrangements for the UN Secretariat have not succeeded as yet in focusing greater attention on the problems and promises of science and technology for the Third World. After three years of bureaucratic battles to earn its "right to exist" within the UN Secretariat, the Centre for Science and Technology for Development is just beginning to play a more active role on technical and policy issues. The Advisory



Committee on Science and Technology for Development, which has been enlarged and now incorporates, in addition to prominent scientists, policy-makers and development specialists, is exploring new ways of working through specialised panels and searching for a larger role within the UN structure. Finally, the Intergovernmental Committee for Science and Technology for Development, which was supposed to be a top level policy and negotiation forum, has lapsed into a rather ineffective body in which high level representation from governments is conspicuously absent.

The situation is even more critical in the Financing System, where the administrator and the staff have made strenuous efforts to obtain funds, develop operational procedures, and process a large number of project proposals. During 1980-1982 their travails were largely successful in creating the impression that progress was being made, and in maintaining the illusion that a well funded financing system was, as a senior member of the staff put it in several occasions, "just around the corner." However, these views are no longer tenable or acceptable. The fact is that instead of the US \$250 million agreed for the period 1980-1981 and the US \$300 million for 1983-1985, the Financing System has obtained less than US \$40 million for the period 1980-1983. Furthermore, even the relatively modest amount of US \$50 million for the period July 1983-June 1984 -- considered by the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee as "the minimum requirement necessary in order to bring the long-term arrangements into effect" -- is unlikely to be raised.<sup>8</sup>

There are other potential problem areas for the

Financing System, such as the apparent lack of focus in project selection, the weaknesses found in project execution, and the shortcomings of project monitoring, but they could be handled without difficulty should the System become a viable proposition. Careful attention should also be given to the possible consequences for multilateral funding of the "core" and "non-core" components of the System, particularly in view of the interest shown by donor countries in contributing to the non-core component where conditions on the use of funds can be introduced.

Considering the present situation of the programmatic, institutional, and financial aspects of the Vienna Programme of Action on Science and Technology for Development, what options are open to the governments and individuals committed to the objectives, principles, and activities agreed during the UNCSTED negotiations? While a full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper, a few suggestions and ideas may be advanced.

In the first place, there is no need to discard or drastically revise the Vienna Programme of Action and its Operational Plan; their recommendations are and will be valid during the next decade for most Third World countries. However, it would be necessary for developing countries with similar levels of scientific and technological capabilities, or for regional groups of countries, to specify priorities for the different components of the Programme and the Plan. These priorities should provide guidelines for the activities of the various agencies, bodies, and organs in the UN System, as well as for the non-governmental organisations working in the field of science and technology for development.



A serious shortcoming of the Vienna Programme of Action is the lack of an in-depth treatment of the impact of scientific and technological advances on the future of developing countries. A rather weak background document, the lack of interest of delegations, and the establishment of an isolated working group conspired to make these issues a peripheral concern of the UNCTED negotiations. However, the economic and social consequences of recent advances in microelectronics, informatics, biotechnology, materials science, and similar fields warrant a systematic and comprehensive treatment at the international level. The Advance Technology Alert System (ATAS), being initiated by the Centre for Science and Technology for Development may begin to fill this vacuum, but it is necessary to examine these issues to further detail. This is a task for the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology for Development which should prepare a series of background reports and specific programmes to be discussed and agreed upon in a special session of the Intergovernmental Committee devoted to science, technology and the future.

Secondly, while the institutional arrangements agreed in Vienna need no major restructuring, some adjustments are required to make them more effective. The Centre for Science and Technology for Development should focus on a few problem areas, rather than attempting to cover a wide variety of issues of a technical and administrative nature. Taking advantage of the know-how and expertise accumulated in the various UN agencies and in the Secretariat, the Centre should also explore the possibility of organising and coordinating a multi-agency advisory service on science and technology policies for

developing countries. Finally, for the Centre to perform adequately its functions it will be necessary to upgrade and increase its staff.

The presence of scientists, policy-makers, and development specialists from all regions of the world is a unique asset of the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology for Development. It should capitalise on it by adopting a programme of work that combines the examination of long-term issues with the analysis of short-term problems, giving priority to those for which authoritative international pronouncements could make a difference.

The Intergovernmental Committee on science and Technology for Development needs a major change in the level of representation and the methods of work. In accordance with its status as a plenary subcommittee of the General Assembly, it should become the discussion and negotiation forum envisaged in the Vienna Programme of Action. For this to happen it is imperative to ensure the attendance of high-level government officials at its annual meetings. In addition, the time spent on administrative and operational issues should be reduced to the minimum consistent with the supervisory functions of the Intergovernmental Committee, and more time should be devoted to substantive discussions and negotiations, choosing a single topic for each period of sessions.

Thirdly, it is necessary to stop fooling ourselves and accept that the UN Financing System on Science and Technology for Development has been a failure. If the US \$50 million for the period July 1983-June 1984 -- considered by the Chairman of the Intergovernmental



Committee as the lowest acceptable target -- cannot be raised, the Financing System should be discontinued, at least for a few years. There is no need for an elaborate institutional structure involving a separate Secretariat, an Executive Committee, the Inter-governmental Committee, the UN Development Programme, and other agencies and units in the UN Secretariat, to spend less than US \$10 million per year, much of it in the form of trust funds contributed to the "non-core" component of the Financing System. These arrangements made sense when a minimum level of US \$300 million per year was envisaged for the mid-1980s.

Until a significant amount of resources is raised, it would be better to return to a modified version of the Interim Fund. All the "hard" operational projects should revert to a special unit of the UNDP, while all the projects related to science and technology policies should be transferred to the Centre for Science and Technology for Development. The Secretariat staff of the Financing System should be divided between the UNDP and the Centre, and the administrator of the System should be given an exclusively fund-raising role. When pledges for contributions exceed an agreed minimum, it would be appropriate to re-establish the full UN Financing system for Science and Technology for Development.

#### Lessons from UNCSTED

In contrast with other United Nations fora for negotiation such as the general conferences of UNIDO and UNCTAD, the UN Conference on Science and Technology

for Development was not a direct confrontation between developed and developing countries. On the contrary, negotiations proceeded in an amiable atmosphere and with apparent good faith. Developed countries extracted many concessions on programmatic, institutional, and financial matters from the Group of 77, committing themselves in return to provide support and resources to the Financing System.<sup>9</sup> However, it is now clear that they have not lived up to their commitments and do not intend to do so in the near future. This raises questions regarding the most appropriate future negotiating strategy for the developing countries; it appears that neither confrontation nor compromise lead anywhere.

The international context for North-South negotiations has deteriorated during the last four years, and this situation is likely to prevail during the 1980s. There is an international economic crisis without sustained recovery in sight, and even if there is a strong recovery in the industrialised nations, it is doubtful that the developing countries will benefit from it.<sup>10</sup> Developing countries face a huge foreign debt, the service of which demands an ever increasing share of export earnings, and increased East-West tensions and the renewed arms race are pushing North-South issues, such as the round of Global Negotiations in the United Nations, into the background. This has led to the demise of multilateralism in development assistance and to a new emphasis on bilateral channels; to a reduction of the contributions to all multilateral agencies and funds, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Development Association (IDA), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); and to the use of



technical and financial cooperation for strictly political and military purposes.

Old habits die hard, and the developing countries are slowly beginning to adjust to this new situation. The juxtaposition of plaintive and belligerent attitudes that have characterised the group of 77 positions still remains, while pragmatism and the capacity to recognise mistakes and accept failures are seldom in evidence. The purported unity of the Group of 77 leads to negotiation positions based on the lowest common denominator. This unity usually vanishes when funding questions are involved, for countries in greater need are willing to make concessions while more affluent ones insist on a firm stand on principles.

The experience of the UNCSTED and other United Nations conferences during the last five years indicates that new approaches to North-South negotiations are required. It is necessary to recognise that a new international context has emerged. While the Third World, in spite of substantive achievements and progress, still remains dependent on the North,<sup>11</sup> developing countries should first look for opportunities to collaborate with other developing countries, but in a series and more pragmatic way. The process of development will very likely require a certain degree of disengagement from the North and the acceptance of more austere life-styles, particularly for Southern elites. Furthermore, throughout the UNCSTED negotiations transnational corporations have been conspicuously absent, even though they control a large share of world scientific and technological

capabilities, especially in the most dynamic fields of advanced or frontier technologies.

It is now irrelevant to ask whether the UN Conference for Science and Technology for Development should have taken place or whether it was worth the many millions that the Conference is said to have cost. UNCSTED generated a Programme of Action that can be improved and an institutional structure that can be used more effectively, although it failed in establishing a viable Financing System. Taking advantage of the lessons derived from UNCSTED, developing countries should look forward to and design new approaches for discussions and negotiations on the increasingly complex and difficult issues that are confronting the international community.



## REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. The quotation is from James Thurber in the short story, "The Last Clock," from his book Lanterns and Lances. I am grateful to Alberto Araoz for bringing this short story to my attention.
2. For example, the Economic Commission for Latin America, in collaboration with the UN Centre on Science and Technology for Development, has prepared a document on the progress achieved in the region since the Vienna Conference and has convened a meeting of government experts to review it in early 1984.
3. There was even a heated debate on whether the words "financing system" should be written with a capital "f" and "s" in the final text of the Vienna Programme of Action!
4. The conceptual changes between 1963 and 1979 regarding the interactions among science, technology and development are explored fully in my book, Technology, Planning and Self-reliant Development: A Latin American View, New York: Praeger, 1979.
5. A few months after UNCSTED was held I visited an Asian country where I knew the head of the science and technology policy-making body. It was startling to see how his views had changed after the Vienna conference; he was using a different language, had shifted the emphasis from the performance of research (supply) to the use of research results (demand), and even quoted verbatim from some UNCSTED papers and reports!
6. The background information on the proposals for on financial matters at UNCSTED is summarised in a report I wrote for the UNITAR Science and Technology Working Paper Series in 1979 under the title, Financing the Development of Science and Technology in the Third World. Another UNITAR paper edited by Volker Rittberger and John Renninger under the title, Financial Arrangements for the Promotion of Science and Technology for Development, summarises the discussions of a seminar held one month before the Vienna Conference by a group of delegates and experts.

7. During the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee for UNCSTED in June 1979, I circulated a bogus document that stated the hypothetical recommendations of the Vienna Conference. However, it appears that reality caught up with the satire! The text was the following:

After extensive deliberations and consultations carried out in a spirit of real collaboration and mutual understanding among all countries, the Conference agrees on the following recommendations:

- a) Developing countries may think whatever they wish with regards to science and technology for development;
  - b) Developed countries may do whatever they want with regards to science and technology for development;
  - c) Developed and developing countries should jointly [...] whenever possible and [...] if considered appropriate and;
  - d) Without creating new institutional arrangements or using existing ones, a low level body should be established within the UN System, with no policy or operational functions, and without financing, to monitor the implementation of recommendations (a) to (c) above.
8. This statement was made by the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee on Science and Technology for Development on May 4, 1983 at a special session convened to deal with the Financing System.
  9. For example, the United States delegation at the UNCSTED Conference in Vienna stated unequivocally at the Second Committee that "the US fully supports the proposal for a new fund for science and technology for development. We support the G-77 proposal that this fund have its own identity and be additional to other assistance efforts." (US statement in Committee Two on August 28, 1979). However, and



in spite of the fact that the figure of US \$250 million for the Interim Fund was agreed in informal negotiations with two senior members of the U.S. delegation and two members of the Group of 77, before proposing it as a compromise to the Conference as a whole, the U.S. has not contributed a single cent to the Interim Fund or the Financing System.

10. See for example the articles by S.J. Burki, Frances Stewart, and Dragoslav Avramovic in the August 1983 issue of South magazine under the general title of "Prospect Recovery 1983: End of the Locomotive Age."
11. Ambrose Bierce defines "dependent" as: "reliant upon another's generosity for the support which you are not in a position to extract from his tears." See his Devil's Dictionary.